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THE PROBABILITY OF TENDERING THE LOWEST BID IN SEALED BID 
AUCTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DATA 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is concerned with predicting the probability of tendering the lowest bid in sealed bid 
auctions.  Four of the leading models from the bidding literature are shown to be subsumed 
within a general model – differing only in their method of parameter estimation.  These models 
are then tested relative to the equal probability model by an empirical analysis of a large sample 
of real construction contract bidding data via all-in, one-out and one-on sample frames.  A 
binomial test is used to measure the ability to predict the identity of the lowest bidders and the 
average logscore is used to measure the ability to predict the probability of each bidder being 
the lowest.  Optimal cut-off criterion values are determined for defining the minimum size of 
dataset needed for disaggregating bidders.  The work also highlights the importance of (1) the 
treatment of new entrants and general shortage of data on individual bidders, and (2) the 
treatment of predicted ties. 
 
Keywords: Bidding models, bidding theory, construction contracts, empirical tests, predicted 
probability, probability of lowest bid, sealed bid auctions, tendering theory, binomial test, 
logscore test. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The probability of individual contestants winning a bidding auction can be a useful piece of 
information for many people, not least the contestants themselves.  Potential bidders can 
utilise this information to decide in which auctions to participate, when to try to obtain an 
invitation to participate, whether to enter a bid and, if so, the dollar value of the bid.  Similarly, 
the auctioneer can also utilise the information in deciding when and how to hold the auction, 
how many and which bidders to invite, and the criterion for determining the winner. 
 
Auction bidding is about the price to quote in a sealed auction.  Most of the literature on the 
subject is concerned with setting a price, x, so that the probability, Pr(x), of winning the 
auction reaches some desired level.  Several methods have been proposed for predicting Pr (x), 
and these have been subject to quite lengthy, but yet inconclusive, discussion based on the 
theoretical merits of each method.  To date, there have been no empirical tests applied, 
presumably due to the lack of development of appropriate tests.  Recent work by Wallace and 
Patrick (1993) and Dowe et al (1996), however, has demonstrated the use of a logarithmic 
scoring function for probabilistic predictions and this, together with a new form of binomial 
test, has cleared the way for the tests described in this paper.  These methods are applied to 
four sets of construction contract bidding data, with some adjustments due to the limitations of 
the data. 
 
In concentrating exclusively on empirical testing, the work described in this paper is rather 
less ambitious than previous studies of auction bidding in restricting the scope of the study to 
the prediction of Pr(x) without specifying any related functions.  On the other hand, bearing in 
mind the wide range of potential uses mentioned above, for both bidders and auctioneers, it is 
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possible that the results may have a greater potential breadth of application than normally 
found in the bidding literature.  This paper is presented in the context of construction contract 
bidding.  Although there may be some idiosyncrasies in the procedural details involved, 
generalisation to other domains should be a relatively simple matter. 
 
 
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
The competitive pressures in the construction industry, it has been said, are probably more 
intense than in any other industry (Park, 1972:24.1).  In the presence of such pressures it is not 
altogether surprising that, judging from the reported attitude of some companies, competitive 
bidding is less of a competition based on costs or profit margins, than a lottery in which the 
inherent uncertainty of the process decides the winner (Whittaker, 1970).  Indeed, according to 
McCaffer (1976) there is "... substantial evidence that existing bidding processes are little 
more than random".  Pim's (1974) analysis of the number of projects awarded to four USA 
construction companies indicates that the average number of projects acquired is generally 
proportional to the reciprocal of the average number of bidders competing - the proportion that 
would be expected to be won by pure 'chance' alone (Table 1).  This suggests an extremely 
simple ‘equal probability’ model in which the expected probability of entering the lowest bid 
in a k-size auction, that is, an auction in which k bidders enter bids, is the reciprocal of k. 
 
Several formulations have been advanced that claim to offer a theoretical improvement on 
Pim’s equal probability model, none of which have yet been tested empirically.  Of these, 
four main approaches are considered.  These comprise Friedman (1956), Gates (1967), Carr 
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(1982) and Skitmore (1991).  As will be shown, all are based on the same statistical model 
but differ in their detailed assumptions of its specification. 
 
 
BIDDING MODELS 
 
Let xi be a bid entered by bidder i for a sealed bid auction and let xi ~ fi (μi,σi) where μi and σi 
represent the various location and scale parameters respectively in the probability distribution, 
fi, from which the ith bid is drawn.  If, for a particular auction, the k bids are each treated as 
continuous random variables with joint probability density function f(x1, x2, ... , xk), then the 
probability, Pr(x1 lowest), that bidder 1 enters the lowest bid, is 
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In this case, bidder 1 was chosen as the reference bidder although (1) and (2) can clearly be 
modified for other reference bidders in the auction to obtain Pr(x2lowest), Pr(x3lowest), etc.  
For convenience, however, we will continue to refer to bidder 1 as the reference bidder in the 
notation. 
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ESTIMATION METHODS TO BE TESTED 
 
The five estimation methods investigated comprised: (1) the equal probability method; (2) 
Friedman’s (1956) method; (3) Gates’ (1967) method; (4) Carr’s (1982) method; and (5) 
Skitmore’s (1991) method.  These are summarised in Table 2 and described in detail below 
including the necessary modifications that had to be made due to the limitations of the data 
and nature of the analysis.  All assume independence of bids and therefore (2) applies. 
 
 
(1) Equal probability method 
 
The equal probability method, as implied by Pim, directly predicts each bidder's probability of 
being the lowest bidder as 1/k, i.e. Pr(x1)=Pr(x2)= ... = 1/k for a given k-size auction.  The 
same result is obtained when all bids are identically and independently distributed, i.e., where 
f1( ) =  f2( ) = …, = fk( ), μ1 =μ2 = … , = μk, and σ1= σ2= … , = σk 
 
This is essentially the control model representing chance.  A good estimation method should, 
of course, outperform the equal probability method by definition.  Of course, it is not possible 
to predict winners this way as all are tied. 
 
(2) Friedman’s method 
 
Friedman’s approach is to transform xi by dividing by the reference bidder’s cost estimates, c1, 
i.e., 
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 xiF = xi/c1 (3) 
 
the shape and other distribution parameters for xiF being estimated from the frequency 
distribution of the xiF ratios for each competitor.  x1F is however assigned the arbitrary 
parameter values μ1= x*/c* and σ12 = 0, where x* and c* are the reference bidder’s bid and 
cost estimate for the next auction. 
 
Friedman’s approach relies heavily on the availability of data, the theoretical density functions 
being be fitted provided there are data for “enough previous contracts” (Friedman, 1956:107).  
A range of criterion values was used to determine this, ie., q=1,2,...,30, where q denotes the 
minimum number of previous bidding encounters between the reference bidder and a specific 
competitor.  Where the actual number of previous bidding encounters between the reference 
bidder and a specific competitor was less than q, the probability was estimated as the mean 
'success', p , of the reference bidder against all other bidders, ie., 
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where p(i') is the probability of the reference bidder’s cost estimate being less than bidder i’s 
bid, p(i') being estimated by the ratio of the number of previous auctions where the reference 
bidder’s cost estimates were less than bidder i‘s bids to the total number of auctions where the 
reference bidder bid against bidder i.  Where no previous meetings of a pair of bidders had 
taken place, each bidder in the pair was assigned a 0.5 probability of underbidding the other. 
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To enable Pr(xi lowest ) to be estimated for all bidders, the reference bidder’s cost estimate 
values value was substituted with the bid value in Friedman’s parameter estimation procedure 
and in computing p(i').  Similarly, the constant x*/c* was modified to x*/x* = 1. 
 
 
(3) Gates’ method 
 
Gates’ approach is to estimate Pr(x1 lowest) directly, by the formula: 
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where p(i') is the probability of the reference bidder’s cost estimate being less than bidder i’s 
bid as described above.  It can be shown that this is the exact result if, and only if, fi(xi ) is 
logistic, although a close approximation to the result may be obtained when normality and 
homogeneity (equal variances) are assumed. 
 
Gates' model is recommended for use in situations where there is "sufficient bidding data relating 
to every competitor bidder on the particular job" (Gates, 1967:84).  As with Friedman’s method, 
a range of q values was tried and the same procedure used where less than q meetings occurred. 
 
To enable Pr(xi lowest ) to be estimated for all bidders, cost estimates were again substituted 
by bid values. 
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(4) Carr’s method 
 
Carr uses Friedman’s transformation for xi and x1 where, in addition, x1 is also substituted by 
c1, resulting in the unusual transformation 
 
 x1C = c1/c1 (6) 
 
in which the denominator and numerator are assumed to be separate independent random 
variables.  The arbitrary assumption that the xiF and x1C are normally and homogeneously 
(equal variances) distributed then allows the straightforward estimation of the required 
parameters from the frequency distribution of the pooled xiF ratios. 
 
Carr’s approach presents no difficulty in handling sparse data as normality and homogeneity 
are assumed.  The only change made was to again substitute the cost estimates c1 with the bids 
x1 to enable all bidder’s Pr (xi lowest) estimates to be made.  Bidders with less than q data 
points were assigned equal probabilities (1/k). 
 
(5) Skitmore’s method 
 
Skitmore’s approach uses maximum likelihood estimates to fit the model yij ~ N(αi+βj, si2) to 
the transformed values yij = ln(xij-mx(1)j) where m is a constant with 0.5<m<0.9 (x(1)j being the 
value of the lowest bid for the jth auction) and N( ) is the Normal probability density function. 
  The probability prediction for y1 
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is then obtained by substituting the estimates αi and si into μi and σi respectively . 
 
The method is difficult to apply in this form however as it involves the additional estimation of 
x(1).  More recently, Skitmore and Pemberton’s (1994) circumvented this problem by recourse 
to a simple natural log transformation, ie. xiS = lnxi, and this was also used here.  From this, 
the probability of each bidder winning is computed.  In cases where there was less than q data 
points for a bidder, that bidder was assigned an average α and s value. 
 
The Skitmore model treats bidders with a single data point (one recorded previous bid) as 
having an alpha value based on that bid.  A modification was also used which assigns these 
bidders with the average alpha value of all other bidders.  The simple natural log 
transformation was again used. 
 
 
DATA 
 
Four sets of data, termed here , were analysed.   are reproduced in Appendix 
A. 
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Case 1 data 
 
A construction company operating in the London area donated data.  The data covered 
all the company's building contract bidding activities during a twelve month period in the early 
1980's in a total of 86 auctions.  Details of the type of projects were available but not used in 
the analysis.  Some of the data was incomplete, that is the value of some bids or the identity of 
bidders was not known by the company.  In several cases, it was possible to supplement these 
data from a bidding information agency in the London area.  The resulting number of auctions 
for which a full set of bids, together with the identity of the bidder, was available for analysis 
totalled 51. 
 
 
Case 2 data 
 data were donated by a north of England County Council for building contract bids over 
approximately four years prior to July 1982.  Details of 258 contracts were provided in a 
precoded format.  In other cases codes were missing or no tenders had been received.  In yet 
other cases the codes or bids were illegible.  The resulting number of contracts for which a full 
set of bids, together with the identity of the bidder, was available for analysis totalled 218. 
 
 
Case 3 data 
 
 data were obtained from the records of a bidding information agency in the London 
area.  The agency held details of most bids for most building contracts in the London area in 
card form.  A period of one week was spent copying a sample of contract data for the period 
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November 1976 to February 1977.  The bids and associated bidders' names were recorded 
and the names later encoded for analysis.  The resulting number of contracts for which a full 
set of bids, together with the identity of the bidders, were available for analysis totalled 373. 
 
Case 4 data 
 
 data comprised the combined  and  data.  This was possible because of the 
identical bidder coding systems used for both . 
 
 
TESTING FRAMES 
 
As the sole purpose of bidding models is for use in forecasting future outcomes, it is necessary 
to apply the models to out-of-sample data in addition to the in-sample data.  Three forecast 
sample-testing frames are applied: (1) the all-in frame, (2) the one-out frame and (3) the one-
on frame 
 
 
The all-in frame 
 
The all-in frame comprises all the data used to build the model.  The testing procedure then 
simply tests the model against the data from which the model was built.  In a similar way to 
the regression coefficient of determination, the error rate for all-in frame analysis is an 
unrealistically low measure of forecasting ability due to the self-fulfilling nature of the 
procedure. 
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The one-out frame 
 
The one-out frame involves the use of the cross-validation procedure, by which the first 
auction is omitted from the model building process - the resulting model being applied to the 
omitted auction - this procedure being repeated, with replacement, for all the auctions in the 
 set.  Cross validation provides a reasonably realistic simulated out-of-sample test 
provided no significant time, or sequencing, effects are involved.  The method is equivalent to 
the regression deleted residual analysis 
 
 
The one-on frame 
 
The one-on frame provides a simulation that is perhaps the closest to forecasting reality.  A 
small sample of, say 13 auctions is used to build a model, which is then applied to the 14th 
auction - this procedure being repeated with 14 auctions to build the model which is applied to 
the 15th auction, etc.  Of course, if the model performs better than chance, the results tend to 
improve as the number of auctions used to build the model increases.  The final model, which 
incorporates all except the last auction, coincides with the final one-out model.  The one-out 
frame results are therefore indicative of the final stages of the one-on results. 
 
 
TESTS  
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Two fundamental approaches are available for testing the validity of a bidding model.  One 
is to examine the structural correspondence of the model with its 'real-world' counterpart or 
prototype (Aris, 1978).  The alternative, used here, is to test the model's predictions against 
actual outcomes.  The first problem encountered in testing a model's probability prediction 
against an actual outcome is that the actual outcome of a single event in the bidding context is 
a binary result - one bidder wins (underbids all its competitors) or loses (is underbid by one of 
its competitors) the auction.  For example, imagine an auction comprising several bidders and 
we are also testing two models, both of which provide a probability prediction of each bidder 
winning the auction.  The highest ranked probability predictions for model 1 are bidder B, 
with 0.41, closely followed by bidder A, with 0.4.  The highest ranked probability predictions 
for model 2 one the other hand are bidder A, with 0.3 and bidder, with 0.2.  Assuming A 
actually wins the auction, which is the best model? 
 
Intuitively, the best model is the one that provides the highest predicted probability for bidder 
A.  This leads us to the conclusion that model 1 is best, as bidder A's predicted probability of 
winning (0.4) is greater than model 2’s predicted probability (0.3).  However, it also seems 
intuitively reasonable that the model that best predicts the actual winner (i.e. the bidder with 
the highest relative probability of success) is best, i.e. model 2. 
 
This suggests two distinct lines of analysis (1) to compare the predicted binary win-lose 
outcome with the actual binary win-lose outcome, and (2) to compare the predicted probability 
with the actual binary win-lose  outcome. 
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Testing predicted binary outcomes: the binomial test 
 
Here we wish to test the predicted binary win-lose outcome against the actual win-lose 
outcome.  For example, consider a series of auctions comprising three bidders, A, B and C.  
Assume the model’s probability predictions for auction 1 are 0.45, 0.35 and 0.2 for A, B and C 
respectively.  We then convert these probability predictions to win-lose predictions, so that 
bidder A, having the highest probability prediction, is predicted to be the winner (and 
therefore, by implication, bidders B and C are predicted to be losers).  The probability 
predictions for the other auctions are then processed in the same way.  These win-lose 
predictions then compared with the actual winners and losers.  Two questions now need to be 
answered (1) is the model doing any better than chance? and (2) given two models, which is 
the better model? 
 
The binomial test can obviously be used to obtain the probability of a chance result for a set of 
k-size auctions by means of the cumulative binomial probability.  Let Rk be a discrete 
binomially distributed random variable, then the probability of obtaining a value of rk or less is 
the sum of the probabilities of obtaining a value of h=0, 1, ..., rk, ie.,  
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over dk auctions. 
 
To combine different k-size auction sets, the required probability is 
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d2, d3, ... , dt denoting the number of k=2, 3, ... , t –size auctions respectively, and  
 
 0,...1 32 ==+++= hth otherwisehmmmwhen δδ  (12) 
 
There are, however, logistical difficulties with (10).  The computational time is excessive.  A 
good approximation can be obtained by -wise simulation.  Here, for s=1,2,…,s’ iterations, 
Pr(R=h) in (11) is estimated by  
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where 
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1=hξ    when hs=h 
    = 0    otherwise 
 
and 
 
 ∑∑=
l i
ijssh γ  (14) 
 
where 
 
     1=ijsγ      when Pij+ < 1/kj 
              = 0     otherwise 
 
Pij+ being a random deviate from U(0,1). 
 
 
Testing predicted probabilities: the Logarithmic Score Test 
 
Good’s (1952) logarithmic score function, recently generalised by Bernado and Smith 
(1994:74-5), has been used previously in testing predicted probabilities of this kind (Wallace 
and Patrick, 1993; Dowe et al, 1996).  This involves calculating the log scores, L, for each 
predicted probability, ie., 
  
 17
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
+=
2
1ln
*)ln(1 pL  (15) 
 
where p* = mod[P+(p-1)],  P is the predicted probability and p is the outcome (p=1 if the 
bidder is the lowest, p=0 if the bidder is not the lowest). 
 
To compare different models, the mean of L is calculated for each  and sample-frame.  
High values indicate better predictions than low values.  There are no statistical tests that 
indicate the significance of these differences. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Fig 1 shows the results for the binomial tests on the five models (E, F, G, C, S1 and S2 
representing the Pim equal probability model, Friedman, Gates, Carr and the two Skitmore 
models respectively) for q=1,2, ..., 30 for  and  for the one-out and one-on frames.  
This shows the quite different results that occur for each case and over the q value series.  
Table 3 summarises these results at the optimal q values for all the  and frames.  The 
cumulative binomial probability, Pr(R≤r), is the probability the results could have occurred by 
chance alone and hence is around 0.5 for the E model.  A Pr(R≤r) value of near zero therefore 
indicates a much superior performance than chance alone  Thus, there are excellent predictive 
results for all models compared with E for the all-in frame for all , and the one-out and 
one-on frames for .  C, S1 and S2 models are also excellent for the one-out frame for 
 and , with C and S1 being very good for the one-on frame for  and .  Table 4 
summarises the successful discrete (number of winners) predictions at the optimal q values of 
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the various models.  The first column contains the k-size of the contracts (k), second column 
gives the number of k-size contracts (n), E1 is the real value of the random expectation, n/k, 
and E2 is E1 approximated to the nearest integer (0.5 being rounded upwards), F, G, C, S1 
and S2 contain the number of wins successfully predicted by using the Friedman, Gates, Carr 
and Skitmore methods respectively, for .  The other columns give the same statistics for 
 to .  For example, the all-in results for  show that there are six k=4-size 
auctions with an expected random (E1) winner prediction rate of 1.50 (6/k), which is two 
rounded to the nearest integer (E2).  The Friedman (F) and Gates (G) models successfully 
predicted five out of the six winners, with the Carr (C) and original Skitmore (S1) models 
successfully predicting four winners and the modified Skitmore (S2) model successfully 
predicting three out of the six winners.  The totals for all the all-in  results show the F  
and G models to be the best, with 37 winners being successfully predicted, followed by the C, 
S1 and S2 models, with 25, 23 and 16 successful predictions respectively.  Ties sometimes 
occurred when a model predicted the same probability for two or more bidders in the same 
auction.  The number of these tied results is given in Table 5. 
 
Fig 2 shows the results for the logarithmic score tests for q=1,2, ..., 30 for  and  for 
the one-out and one-on frames.  As the figure shows, the models rarely better the equal 
probability model.  Table 6 summarises these results at the optimal q values for all the  
and frames, the best results being shown in bold text.  The results indicate a general 
superiority of S2 over the other models for the one-out and one-on frames.  No statistical tests 
are available to test the significance of this result however. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
In terms of straight lowest bidder prediction, the analysis shows the best models to be C and 
S1, with S1 being marginally better than C for the larger sample sizes.  The F and G models 
are generally much poorer.  With the notable exception of the F and G model  and  
one-on frames, all perform equal to or better than chance alone (model E).  However, these 
results appear to be heavily influenced by the presence of ties – the weaker models producing 
a high number of tied predictions.  It is clear that a mixed strategy, involving the random 
selection of predicted low bidders when ties are predicted, would have a considerable 
influence on these results. 
 
The problem of ties does not of course exist with the Logscore analysis, as each bidder’s 
probability prediction is taken in isolation.  The results of this (Table 7) show the superiority 
of S2 in six of the eight out of sample tests, being narrowly outperformed by S1 in the  
one-on frame. 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the analysis is the close similarity of the results obtained by 
the F and G models in terms of predicted low bidders and wide dissimilarity in terms of actual 
probability estimates, the F model grossly underestimating the probabilities involved.  This 
underestimation of probabilities is not unexpected and has been anticipated by several writers 
(e.g., Gates, 1967, Weverbergh, 1981, 1982) on theoretical grounds for it is plain that the 
expedient of assigning a zero variance to the reference bidder is certain to bias the results 
towards low probability estimates. 
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It is also unsurprising to find S1 and S2 producing the generally better results as these models, 
being multivariate, naturally utilise more of the available data. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous work in auction bidding has to a large extent been carried out without any real 
supporting data.  In the context of construction contract auction bidding, it has been doubtful 
that sufficient data can be mustered for each bidder for any effective predictions to be made.  
In analysing some real and typical sets of auction bid data it has been possible to compare the 
major models here against pure chance and each other, showing that all offer an improvement 
on chance with multivariate models generally give the best results.  The benefits if using these 
models in practice are, however, like the models themselves, statistical in nature.  Like 
professional gamblers, proficient bidders given even a slight edge over chance should be able 
to exploit this to advantage over a period of time.  The main drawback for construction 
contract bidders is that the precarious nature of the industry can mean that there is no long-
term future as a single slip can often have terminal consequences. 
 
Further empirical treatment of this topic would benefit by closer study of the behaviour of new 
entrants to aid the general development of predictive models where there is a shortage of data 
on individual bidders.  The subject area would also benefit from the development of more 
sophisticated models that 
 
• Enable the estimation of the covariance terms in the model to avoid the independence 
assumption 
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• Can handle a variety of uncertainties in the identity and/or number of bidders involved 
 
• Allow the introduction of other influencing factors, such as contract type, size and 
location. 
 
• Take account of changing market conditions and bidding behaviours over time 
 
• Allow for different selection criteria or price award (e.g. the second lowest bid) 
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SYMBOL TABLE 
 
^( ) lognormal pdf 
δh dummy variable αi parameter in Skitmore’s model σij scale parameter for xij βj parameter in Skitmore’s model 
µij location parameter for xij γijs dummy variable ξh dummy variable 
c component of bid 
c* value of bidder 1’s cost estimate for the next auction 
c1 bidder 1’s cost estimate 
C Carr’s model 
dk Binomial d for set of k-size auctions 
E Equal probability model 
E1 real value of random expectation 
E2 E1 approximated to nearest integer 
F Friedman’s model 
f(x1,x2, … ) joint pdf for bidders 1,2,… 
fi(xi) pdf of bidder i’s bids 
G Gates’ model 
h total number of correctly predicted lowest bidders for a set of auctions 
hs comparator in Binomial test 
i bidder ID code 
j auction sequence number (j=1,2,…) 
k number of bidders in the auction 
L logarithmic score 
m constant in Skitmore’s model 
m2,m3,… components of h 
N( ) normal pdf 
p outcome dummy variable in Logscore test 
p(i’) probability bidder 1’s cost estimate is lower than bidder i 
p* logscore variable 
P predicted probability 
Pij+ random deviate from U(0,1) 
Pr( ) probability of being the lowest bidder 
Pr(x1) probability bidder 1 will be the lowest 
q minimum data set for a bidder (S1 and S2) or pair of bidders (F and G) 
R binomial R 
r binomial r 
Rk binomial R for set of k-size auctions 
rk binomial r for set of k-size auctions 
s simulation number 
s’ total number of simulations 
si2 parameter in Skitmore’s model 
S1 Skitmore’s model 
S2 modified Skitmore’s model 
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t total 
U(0,1) uniform pdf with min 0 and max 1 
w counter 
x(1)j lowest bid in auction j 
x* value of bidder 1’s bid for the next auction 
x1C Carr’s bid transformation (c1/c1) 
xi bidder i’s bid  
xiF Friedman’s bid transformation (xi/c1) 
XiF random variable of which xiF is a value 
xS Skitmore and Pemberton’s bid transformation (xS = lnx) 
y1,y2,… dummy variables in Equations (1) and (2) 
yij Skitmore’s bid transformation {yij = ln(xij – mx(1)j)} 
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CAPTIONS 
 
Table Caption 
1 Frequency of low bids 
2 Parameter estimation 
3 Binomial probabilities 
4 Predicted successes 
5 Ties 
6 Mean logscores 
 
 
Figure Caption 
1 Binomial tests q cut-offs 
a  one-out 
b  one-on 
c  one-out 
d  one-on 
2 Logarithmic scores q cut-offs 
a  one-out 
b  one-on 
c  one-out 
d  one-on 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Company   No of No of Mean no bids % win by    % 
 auctions bids per auction  chance actually won 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   A    41  249   6.1   16.4    17.0 
   B    36  183   7.0   14.2    15.4 
   C    19   88   4.6   21.6    21.1 
   D    35  202   5.8   21.6    17.1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Pim (1974:541) 
Table 1: Frequency of low bids 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source Parameters  Estimation 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Friedman Fi(xi) ~Fi(μi,σi 2)  xi/c1 ratios 
 F1(x1) ~ F1(x*/c*,0) 
Gates Fi(xi) ~ L( )  Pr(x) estimated directly 
 F1(x1) ~ L( )   
Carr Fi(xi) ~ N(μ,σ 2/2)  xi/c1 ratios 
 F1(x1) ~ N(1,σ 2/2)  xi/c1 ratios 
Skitmore Fi(xi) ~ ^(μi,σ i2)  MLL (iteration) 
 F1(x1) ~ ^(μ1,σ 12)  MLL (iteration) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
N normal pdf 
L logistic pdf 
^ lognormal pdf 
 
 Table 2: Parameter estimation
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Frame 
 Pr(R≤r) q Pr(R≤r) q Pr(R≤r) q Pr(R≤r) q 
 
All-in 
E 0.5103 - 0.4704 - 0.4286 - 0.5169 - 
F 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
G 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
C 0.0000 0 0.0000  0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
S1 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
S2 0.0033 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
 
One-out 
E 0.5103 - 0.4704 - 0.4286 - 0.5169 - 
F 0.2402 0 0.0006 3 0.4286 3 0.1771 7 
G 0.1451 0 0.0002 3 0.4286 3 0.3332 7 
C 0.2402 2 0.0002 30 0.0000 4 0.0000 0 
S1 0.3651 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
S2 0.3651 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 
 
One-on 
E 0.4863 - 0.4019 - 0.4608 - 0.5061 - 
F 0.4863 5 0.0259 14 0.9973 6 0.9782 17 
G 0.4863 5 0.0538 14 0.9973 6 0.9838 17 
C 0.4863 0 0.0014 0 0.0302 0 0.0020 0 
S1 0.4863 0 0.0002 0 0.0173 0 0.0008 0 
S2 0.3239 0 0.0032 0 0.3621 0 0.0930 0 
  
Table 3: Binomial probabilities 
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k n E1   E2 F G C S1 S2 n  E1   E2 F G C S1 S2 n E1   E2 F G C S1 S2 n R1    R2 F G C S1 S2 
All-in results 
 2 0 0.00 - - - - - -  23 11.50 12 19 19 15 19 19  40 20.00 20 34 34 23 28 27  40 20.00 20 34 34 22 29 27 
 3  1 0.33 0 0 0 1 1 0  16  5.33 5 15 15 11 13 12  53 17.67 18 47 47 31 35 32  54 18.00 18 47 47 32 31 32 
 4  6 1.50 2 5 5 4 4 3  27  6.75 7 17 19 16 13 12  47 11.75 12 38 38 19 24 18  54 13.50 14 43 43 23 25 25 
 5  5 1.00 1 3 3 3 3 1  31  6.20 6 21 22 10 14 11  59 11.80 12 53 54 26 28 26  64 12.80 13 55 55 26 28 26 
 6 21 3.50 3 15 15 7 8 6  47  7.83 8 34 34 19 21 17  85 14.17 14 74 74 42 36 35 105 17.50 17 87 87 47 47 45 
 7  9 1.29 1 6 6 4 3 4  35  5.00 5 19 17 10 10 8  48  6.86 7 44 44 18 18 14  57  8.14 8 50 50 21 22 19 
 8  5 0.63 1 5 5 4 2 1  20  2.50 3 14 14 4 8 5  28  3.50 4 25 26 12 9 7  33  4.13 4 27 28 13 12 8 
 9  3 0.33 0 2 2 1 1 1  12  1.33 1 6 5 3 3 3   8  0.89 1 7 7 4 5 4  11  1.22 1 10 10 4 5 4 
10  1 0.10 0 1 1 1 1 0   2  0.20 0 2 2 2 1 1   4  0.40 0 4 4 4 2 2    5  0.50 0 5 5 5 3 2 
11 0 0.00 - - - - - -   2  0.18 0 2 1 0 0 0   1  0.09 0 1 1 0 0 1    1  0.09 0 1 1 0 0 0 
12 0 0.00 - - - - - - 0  0.00 - - - - - -   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
13 0 0.00 - - - - - -   1  0.08 0 1 1 1 0 0   0  0.00 - - - - - -  0  0.00 - - - - - - 
14 0 0.00 - - - - - -   2  0.14 0   2 2 1 1 1   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
Total 51 8.68 8 37 37 25 23 16 218 47.05 47 152 151 92 103 89 373 87.12 88 327 329 179 185 166 424 95.88 95 359 360 193 202 188 
 
One-out results 
 2 0 0.00 - - - - - -  23 11.50 12 8 8 13 16 16  40 20.00 20 10 10 21 22 23  40 20.00 20 10 10 20 24 24 
 3  1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 1  16  5.33 5 11 11 6 9 10  53 17.67 18 22 22 26 26 24  54 18.00 18 22 22 28 26 26 
 4  6 1.50 2 1 2 3 3 3  27  6.75 7 8 9 13 10 11  47 11.75 12 15 15 19 16 14  54 13.50 14 16 16 22 20 22 
 5  5 1.00 1 0 0 0 0 0  31  6.20 6 12 12 6 10 11  59 11.80 12 13 13 17 15 15  64 12.80 13 15 14 18 19 17 
 6 21 3.50 3 5 5 4 4 3  47  7.83 8 14 14 11 13 13  85 14.17 14 17 16 16 20 17 105 17.50 17 24 22 24 28 24 
 7  9 1.29 1 3 3 1 2 2  35  5.00 5 4 4 6 8 8  48  6.86 7 8 9 7 13 12  57  8.14 8 10 9 14 17 15 
 8  5 0.63 1 0 0 1 0 0  20  2.50 3 6 6 6 6 5  28  3.50 4 1 1 8 5 6  33  4.13 4 4 4 8 5 7 
 9  3 0.33 0 1 1 1 0 0  12  1.33 1 0 0 3 3 3   8  0.89 1 2 2 2 2 4  11  1.22 1 2 2 2 2 4 
10  1 0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0   2  0.20 0 2 2 2 1 1   4  0.40 0 0 0 2 2 1    5  0.50 0 0 0 2 2 0 
11 0 0.00 - - - - - -   2  0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0   1  0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0    1  0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0.00 - - - - - - 0  0.00 - - - - - -   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
13 0 0.00 - - - - - -   1  0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
14 0 0.00 - - - - - -   2  0.14 0   1 1 1 1 1   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
Total 51 8.68 8 10 11 10 9 9 218 47.05 47 66 67 67 77 99 373 87.12 88 88 88 118 121 116 424 95.88 95 103 99 138 143 139 
 
One-on results 
 2 0 0.00 - - - - - -  23 11.50 12 6 6 15 16 13  38 19.00 19 4 4 15 20 17  38 19.00 19 4 4 20 22 17 
 30 
 3  1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0  14  4.67 5 9 9 7 7 6  49 16.33 16 8 8 18 21 17  50 16.67 17 9 9 18 21 17 
 4  3 0.75 1 2 2 2 2 3  27  6.75 7 8 8 9 6 7  46 11.50 12 10 10 15 15 16  53 13.25 13 13 13 19 20 20 
 5  5 1.00 1 0 0 0 0 0  30  6.00 6 7 7 7 9 9  59 11.80 12 10 10 14 11 11  64 12.80 13 12 11 17 14 14 
 6 15 2.50 2 2 2 1 3 1  47  7.83 8 13 13 14 13 11  83 13.83 14 14 14 17 17 14 103 17.17 17 20 20 23 23 19 
 7  7 1.00 1 1 1 2 1 2  33  4.71 5 7 7 5 8 9  46  6.57 7 9 9 6 7 5  55  7.86 8 11 11 9 10 8 
 8  5 0.63 1 0 0 0 0 0  17  2.13 2 1 1 3 2 2  27  3.37 3 3 3 4 4 5  32  4.00 4 3 3 6 6 7 
 9  2 0.22 0 1 1 1 0 1  11  1.22 1 2 1 2 2 2   8  0.89 1 4 4 3 2 1  11  1.22 1 4 4 3 2 1 
10  1 0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0   1  0.10 0 1 0 1 1 1   4  0.40 0 0 0 1 1 0    5  0.50 0 0 0 1 1 0 
11 0 0.00 - - - - - -   1  0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0   1  0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0    1  0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0.00 - - - - - - 0  0.00 - - - - - -   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
13 0 0.00 - - - - - -   0  0.00 - - - - - -   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
14 0 0.00 - - - - - -   2  0.14 0   2 2 0 1 1   0  0.00 - - - - - -    0  0.00 - - - - - - 
 
Total 39 6.53 6 6 6 6 6 7 206 45.15 46 56 54 63 65 61 361 83.79 84 62 62 98 100 86 412 92.55 92 76 75 116 119 103 
 
 
Table 4: Predicted successes 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 F G C S1 S2 F G C S1 S2 F G C S1 S2 F G C S1 S2 
All-in 2 2 0 0 3 5 4 1 0 1 19 18 1 1 11 17 17 1 1 8 
One-out 4 4 0 0 3 15 15 12 1 3 69 69 2 1 10 59 59 2 2 10 
One –on 2 2 1 1 7 23 23 6 6 14 118 119 16 13 48 118 120 16 13 48 
 
       Table 5: Ties 
 
 
 
 
 
Frame   
      L q     L q     L q     L q 
 
All-in 
E1 0.3516 - 0.2977 - 0.2638 - 0.2740 - 
F 0.5919 0 0.5891 0 0.7852 0 0.7394 0 
G 0.6653 0 0.6528 0 0.7800 0 0.7668 0 
C 0.4249 0 0.5980 0 0.3422 0 0.3452 0 
S1 0.4988 0 0.4321 0 0.3936 0 0.3944 0 
S2 0.4280 1 0.4007 1 0.3669 0 0.3712 0 
 
One-out 
E1 0.3516 - 0.2977 - 0.2638 - 0.2740 - 
F 0.0965 7 0.1526 11 0.0425 5 0.0821 6 
G 0.3499 19 0.3223 5 0.2051 4 0.2531 6 
C 0.3497 29 0.3127 24 0.2688 25 0.2752 24 
S1 0.3682 6 0.3084 2 0.2798 10 0.2884 12 
S2 0.3720 5 0.3131 2 0.2836 9 0.2908 12 
 
 
One-on 
E1 0.3578 - 0.2916 - 0.2657 - 0.2759 - 
F 0.0738 8 0.0643 18 0.0778 3 0.0833 14 
G 0.3506 19 0.2098 5 0.2473 3 0.2608 3 
C 0.3747 30 0.2844 15 0.2690 29 0.2786 29 
S1 0.3782 6 0.2920 30 0.2763 8 0.2853 8 
S2 0.3877 5 0.2916 30 0.2781 8 0.2864 8 
  
Table 6: Mean logscores 
 
 
 
